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I do not pretend to be an expert in Islamic philosophy that is the central subject of Dr. 
Mohammad Azadpur’s book, and I have thus learnt a lot from his book. Although I 
am not qualified to comment on the details of the author’s account concerning the 
distinct resources of Islamic philosophy, I would like to make several comments on 
some general points concerning the identity of Islamic philosophy with regard to the 
identity of philosophy, methodological strategy, and the relationship between 
philosophy and religion. With consideration of the critical-engagement purpose of the 
“constructive-engagement dialogue” section, these comments are critical in nature for 
the sake of further exploring some involved philosophically interesting questions. 
 According to Mohammad, if my understanding is correct, what is called ‘Islamic 
philosophy’ or ‘Islamic Peripatetic (philosophical) tradition’ referentially designates 
what Muslims inherited from the Greeks. So it is one key issue how to understand the 
identity of the philosophy by the Greeks. However, there are distinct modern readings 
or interpretations of the identity of Islamic Peripatetic philosophy (given that one 
literal sense of ‘Peripatetic’ is “of or pertaining to the Aristotelian school) or of what 
Muslims inherited from the Greeks. The author challenges “the standard, modernist 
interpretation of what Muslims inherited from the Greeks” and renders it involving “a 
fundamental misunderstanding” (7): “These modernist historians of Islamic 
philosophy consider Greek philosophy to be comprised of systems of rational 
knowledge formulated by different philosophers or schools of philosophy” (ibid.); the 
author adopts Pierre Hadot’s interpretation to the effect that the Greeks saw 
philosophy primarily as the practice of spiritual exercises aimed at the transformation 
of the self and the acquisition of wisdom; the author intends to argue that “this is how 
‘Islamic’ Peripatetic philosophers understood what they inherited from the Greeks” 
and thus that Islamic Peripatetic philosophy means “an Islamic practice of 
philosophical spiritual exercises”. If so, then the next question is this: what has made 
Islamic way of the Greeks-style practice of philosophical spiritual exercises distinct  
and unique? The author argues that “what makes the philosophical way of life 
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advanced by Islamic philosophers unique is the appropriation of this Greek tradition 
into a legacy of Islamic prophetology” (ibid.). My subsequent comments focus on 
several metaphilosophical and methodological issues involved in the foregoing 
approach, in view of similar concerns in some other major philosophical tradition 
(Chinese philosophy, in this case). 
 
1. 
 
My first comment is on the philosophical identity of Islamic Peripatetic tradition. 
Many think that the critique (taking nothing absolutely immune from criticism and 
without blindly claiming anything) and justification (understood in a broad way) 
constitute two closely-related (prescriptive) defining features of philosophical 
inquiries in treating a series of fundamental issues, which might be jointly concerned 
by philosophy and religion. For those who subscribe to and maintain the foregoing 
crucial nature of philosophical inquiries, whether philosophy should be “the practice 
of spiritual exercises aimed at the transformation of the self and the acquisition of 
wisdom” or in “the production of abstract rational discourse” would not be a 
controversial issue; for such a type of critique/justification inquiries can be present in 
both kinds of activities. To this extent, and in this sense, those philosophers would 
agree with the author to his rejection of the account that takes philosophical activity 
merely or exclusively “as the production of abstract rational discourse”; they would 
also agree with the author to his inclusion of “the practice of spiritual exercises aimed 
at the transformation of the self and the acquisition of wisdom”. For instance, this is 
true to many scholars in studies of Chinese philosophy, as classical Chinese 
philosophy (or philosophical “critique/justification” strands/parts of Chinese tradition 
of thought) is largely not the “professional” production of abstract rational discourse. 
However, given the foregoing prescriptive “critique/justification” character of 
philosophy (or if this understanding of the identity of philosophy is reasonable), for 
those who maintain the critique/justification nature of philosophy, what is really at 
issue would lie in the critique/justification character of Islamic philosophy, whether it 
is taken to be the activities and production of a systematic abstract rational discourse 
or the practice of spiritual exercises, whether one focuses on its “rational” layer or 
“imaginative” layer, and whether one pays more attention to its theoretical dimension 
or its practical dimension. Actually, both the production of the abstract rational theory 
account and the practice of spiritual exercises can go in distinct directions: either in 
the critical/justification direction or in the faith-based divinely direction. At this point, 
how to understand and appreciate the nature and features of the legacy of Islamic 
prophetology in Islamic Peripatetic tradition is one key indeed. 
 There is another concern about the author’s characterization of the identity of 
Islamic philosophy in terms of an Islamic practice of spiritual exercises aimed at the 
transformation of the self and the acquisition of wisdom: it seems to be both too 
narrow (i.e., excluding what is expected to be included) and too broad (i.e., including 
what is not expected to be included) [or either the former case or the latter case for 
the consideration to be addressed]. Given that some products of abstract rational 
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discourse, such as many resources in philosophy of language, philosophy of 
mathematics, etc., including those (if any) in Islamic Peripatetic tradition should not 
be excluded from the result of philosophical inquiry, they would be nevertheless 
excluded by the current characterization, as they were carried out without aiming at 
the transformation of the (moral or other dimensions of) self of their practitioners. On 
the other hand, many of those mental or “spiritual” exercises in other intellectual 
activities (such as some of those in math and science) do aim explicitly at improving 
or “transforming” the intellectual-capacity dimension of the self and the acquisition 
of human wisdom involved in those activities, given that such intellectual activities 
constitute one substantial dimension and layer of the human meaningful life; but they 
themselves are not philosophical inquiries due to the nature of the intellectual issues 
or topics under such exploration. One might object that the discourse of “the 
transformation of the self and the acquisition of wisdom” here is restricted to those 
concerning human morality; nevertheless, this would block one possible way-out 
modification for the former case (i.e., seeming to be too narrow). 
 
2. 
 
My second comment or question is related to one point of the foregoing comment: 
given that Islamic Peripatetic tradition includes the prophecy discourse as its crucial 
portion, how can one look at the due relationship between the critique/justification 
character of philosophical activities and the imagination power of prophecy? Should 
such imagination be regulated by adequate critique/justification or eventually be 
based on religious faith in God (in the Islamic sense of the term)? If the imagination 
power of prophecy is to be regulated by adequate critique/justification, then both can 
be compatible or even somehow mutually enhanced. If the imagination power of 
prophecy is supposed to be regulated merely or eventually by God or the absolute 
faith in God, one would further question the philosophical nature of Peripatetic 
tradition while acknowledging and appreciating the value of the prophecy.  
  It is true that, historically speaking, philosophy and religion were not separated 
from each other at earlier (or even recent) stages of development of various 
(culture/region-associated) philosophical traditions as writers (say, in ancient times) 
did not make the conceptual distinction between intellectual disciplines that we do; it 
is also true that some religion-related discourse (topics and resources) might be 
closely related to a philosophical movement in some traditions (for example, the 
current case concerning the prophecy discourse in Islamic philosophy). Nevertheless, 
this amounts to saying neither that there are no significant conceptual distinctions 
between those inquiries, nor that we cannot reflectively and effectively focus on one 
dimension of the whole in the subsequent reflective examination (say, its 
philosophical dimension) nor that we cannot creatively transform a historical 
religiously-oriented discourse into a philosophically-oriented discourse employing 
some relevant and philosophically interesting resources from the previous discourse. 
We can do that, depending on the primary purpose of a project in reflective 
examination. For one thing, if one’s primary purpose is to examine how an idea or 
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approach in one tradition could contribute to some philosophical issue together with 
some other approach (either from the same tradition or from another tradition) instead 
of just giving a historical description, then one is entitled to focus only on the 
philosophical dimension or even only on some aspect(s) of the philosophical 
dimension most relevant to the current concern. For another thing, scholars in 
contemporary studies of Islamic philosophy are indeed entitled to distinguish two 
kinds of prophecy discourse, i.e., (a) the (philosophically-oriented) prophecy 
discourse that is supposed to be regulated by adequate critique/justification, and (b) 
the (religiously-oriented) prophecy discourse that is supposed to be regulated merely 
or eventually by God or the absolute faith in God, even if it might be the case that the 
former prophecy discourse, (a), was not historically produced but is reflectively and 
creatively produced by contemporary scholarship in Islamic philosophy for the need 
of philosophical inquiry.  
  Applying that distinction to ancient Islamic materials reveals the similar degree of 
overlap and distinctiveness as it does to ancient Western materials or ancient Chinese 
materials, which also did not distinguish what we now call ‘philosophy’ from what is 
called ‘natural philosophy’ (incipient science) or what is called ‘Chinese thought’. In 
keeping with this consideration, we can soundly and reflectively focus on the 
philosophical aspects and dimensions of texts that also have historical, literary or 
religious value and content. So nothing in this observation about Islamic thought 
prevents us from reflecting on the philosophical significance of an idea or approach in 
the tradition where its philosophical value and inferential connection with other 
concerns, issues, ideas or approaches could also be given a historical, literary or 
religious description. When providing the philosophical dimension, we legitimately 
focus one type of reflective interest or agenda in trying to understand one significant 
aspect of Islamic culture; we can do so without denying that other kinds of 
understanding and elaboration are possible. We have the conceptual resources to 
distinguish between thinkers, themes, ideas and arguments that are more or less 
philosophical or religious. Given our understanding of philosophical inquiry and how 
its methodology differs from a religious methodology, the overlap of subject matter 
and the fact that the methods are mixed does not prevent our highlighting and 
discussing the philosophical distinctions and reflecting on how the overlap might and 
might not be relevant to proper understanding of both ancient Islamic philosophy and 
religion. Indeed, for this reason, what is under our current focus is called ‘Islamic 
philosophy’ and not ‘Islamic thought’ or ‘Islamic religion’, given that we do not want 
to conceptually conflate them and take these labels simply as each other’s nicknames 
or alternative titles.
1
 
 
3. 
 
My final question about which I would like to consult Mohammad is this: If the very 
                                                 
1
 For my earlier (more comprehensive) discussion of some general methodological points involved 
here, see Mou 2009, sections 1and 3. 
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conception of Islamic philosophy is not limited to that of Islamic Peripatetic tradition 
but broadly includes all reflective activities or strands of critique/justification in 
treating various fundamental concerns in human moral or other intellectual life within 
the Islamic tradition (whether they are presented in “the practice of spiritual exercises 
aimed at the transformation of the self and the acquisition of wisdom” or in “the 
production of abstract rational discourse”, and whether they occur in Islamic 
Peripatetic tradition or in some other Islamic movements of thought), what would 
result in from this conception of Islamic philosophy? Would this conception of 
Islamic philosophy result in damaging some core ideas of Islamic Peripatetic tradition 
or exclude some significant philosophical resources? Would this conception of 
Islamic philosophy be reflectively more constructive and philosophically more 
inclusive? [The case might be similar to that concerning the identity of Chinese 
philosophy in this connection: Chinese philosophy, as widely realized, intrinsically 
includes philosophical resources from diverse engaging movements of thoughts 
instead of, say, Confucian tradition only or even ancient (or classical) Chinese 
philosophy only, as one of the intrinsic defining features of Chinese philosophy lies in 
the critical engagement between its distinct parts (such as that between the Confucian 
and Daoist thinkers during the pre-Han period and that between the traditional 
Chinese philosophy and its contemporary critique). That is one of the sources where 
the critical while constructive potential of Chinese philosophy lies.] 
  Let me highlight the points of my foregoing comments in this way. I have no 
doubt about the philosophical nature of Mohammad’s book: indeed, it seems to me 
that the author’s book itself fits into the foregoing defining character of philosophy 
which has been characterized above. He presents a critique of certain 
understandings/interpretations of what Islamic philosophy is and makes an argument 
for a distinct account. One question is thus this: may one or should one apply these 
features to characterize the identity of Islamic philosophy, both at the level of the 
practice of spiritual exercises and at the level of the production of abstract rational 
discourse (whether within or beyond but still within the Islamic tradition)? In other 
words, can one say that reason and imagination in philosophy should be both 
unbound to any ad hoc activities/boundaries (say, “the production of abstract rational 
discourse”) and should be bound in the sense that philosophical inquiries are to be 
subjected to and regulated by adequate critique and justification (whether they are in 
Western philosophy, in Chinese philosophy or in Islamic philosophy)? 
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